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Abstract 
The contribution shows the state of the art of “trade and non-tariff measures” debate in 
the agri-food sector. It provides an overview on trends in trade and in the level of 
policy interventions over the last decades, in order to shed lights on potential cause-
effect relations. Comparing the evolution of trade and of non-tariff measures (NTMs) 
in agri-food sector, it appears that the pervasiveness of NTMs is likely to be strictly 
related to changes in trade patterns. Although the main scope of NTMs is to correct 
market inefficiencies, they may have a two-fold role: trade catalysts or trade barriers. 
The potential relationships between trade and NTMs, however, differ across involved 
countries, products under regulation, and types of measure. Indeed, evidence from the 
empirical literature support either the “standards as catalysts” and the “standards as 
barriers” points of view. Our contribution aims at outlining how NTMs and trade 
influence each other. 
 
A revised version of the present paper will appear in a chapter of the European Yearbook of 
International Economic Law. 
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1 Introduction 
International agri-food trade is a priority area due to a set of important policy 
questions that need to be deepened. Although most of the driving forces of agri-food 
markets are not new, the implications of trade policy issues are frequently substantial, 
redistributive and pervasive1. Therefore, understanding the dynamics of agri-food 
trade, and of related trade policies, has become a topic of utmost importance for 
policymakers and for applied economists. 
Despite its small and declining importance in the global economy, agri-food market is 
politically sensitive and highly contentious in international trade negotiations2. The 
political sensitiveness of agri-food trade is related to the complex dynamics that occur 
among involved stakeholders: trade allows specialisation, and thus comparative 
advantages, of producers, and provides a wider and diversified range of products to 
consumers3. The frequent disputes arising in international negotiations for agri-food 
trade are due to the high levels of protection: as a consequence, trade distortions in 
agri-food sector are exceptional and highly controversial relative to those in other 
sectors4. 
The trade policy agenda is greatly different from that over the past 25 years. The main 
reason is the emergence of trade policy issues to be addressed at national and regional 
levels. The recent period of relative openness to trade of agri-food markets has 
contributed to a substantial redistribution of market shares and levels of protection 
from developed to developing countries. The main challenge of policymakers is to 
obtain an optimum for all countries, given the trade gains reached from international 
negotiations5. In this regard, the risk is to incur in high protection and strong political 
support at domestic level, which may be suboptimal at global level6. 
In recent years, much of the attention of the international political agenda is on the 
trade disputes that gravitate towards agri-food support, protection, and market access. 
Indeed, the long-lasting protection of domestic agri-food markets has determined 
severely distortions at national and international levels. The consequent delay in 
development of agri-food sector has contributed to a growing pressure for reforming 
agri-food policies. The crucial and complex set of negotiations of the World Trade 
Organisation (WTO), in the mid-1990s, has attempted to liberalise trade and to create 
a trade policy environment, characterised by a more sustainable growth and a less 
government intervention. 
The negotiations of the WTO has increased opportunities of market access, by 
lowering traditional barriers to trade (i.e., tariffs). However, growing concerns have 
been raised on the proliferation of non-tariff measures (NTMs) and on their potential 
impacts on trade performances7. Although the main scope of NTMs is to correct 
market inefficiencies, they may have a two-fold role: trade catalysts or trade barriers8. 
For instance, if Panel and Appellate Body reports or the ECJ judgements are in favour 
of non-integration, the national regulation may hamper trade and vice-versa. The 
potential of having both negative and positive effects on trade may explain the move 
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 Martin, 2018. 
2
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4
 Trebilcock and Pue, 2015. 
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 Bagwell and Staiger, 2011. 
6
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from non-tariff barriers (a more restrictive definition) to non-tariff measures. Thus, 
non-tariff trade policies may have both potential winners and losers: while many 
countries benefit from trade liberalisation, others may suffer considerable loss. 
Understanding what are the policy implications of such changes is essential in order to 
identify positive and negative perspectives. 
The contribution provides analytically based insights into the potential correlations 
between trade and the level of policy interventions in agri-food sector. It offers 
perspectives and evidence on the evolution of trade and NTMs over recent decades. It 
aims to extend the understanding of the “trade and NTMs” debate to stimulate more 
research into this important topic. 
 
2 Trade of agri-food products: a global perspective 
During the last two decades, global agri-food trade has been interested by rapid and 
dynamic changes with a significant re-shaping of trade patterns. 
The traded value of agri-food products has progressively increased at global level over 
the longer term. Since the negotiations of the World Trade Organisation (WTO) in the 
mid-1990s, exports grew by 23% from 1995 to 2005, and by 53% from 2005 to 2015; 
similarly, imports expanded by 30% from 1995 to 2005, and by 44% from 2005 to 
2015 (figure 1). The results is a global trade balance in agri-food sector significantly 
higher in 2015 compared to 19959. 
 
Figure 1. Global trade balance in agri-food sector in 1995, 2005, 2015. 
 
Source: elaboration on UN Comtrade (2017). 
 
A remarkable increase has interested, in particular, developing countries: since 1995 
until 2015, their trade flows have grown more rapidly than those of developed 
                                                          
9
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economies10. Considering a selection of developed (North) and developing countries 
(South)11, we find that South-North and South-South trade have grown exponentially 
(from 21 to4,230 billion US$), North-North trade has become six times greater, and 
North-South trade has decoupled12 (table 1). 
 
Table 1. Trade (in billion US$) of selected agri-food product categoriesa in 1995 and 
2015: detail by trade patternsb. 
Origin country 
Destination country 
North South Total 
1995 2015 1995 2015 1995 2015 
North 556 3,200 279 2,850 835 6,050 
South 10 1,660 11 2,570 21 4,230 
Total 566 4,860 290 5,420 856 10,280 
Source: elaboration on UN Comtrade (2017). 
a
 Product categories, coded according to the Harmonised System (HS) 2-Digit Chapter 
Headings, are as follows: (02) Meat; (03) Fish; (04) Dairy produce; (07) Edible 
vegetables; (08) Edible fruit and nuts; (10) Cereals; (12) Oil seeds and oleaginous 
fruits; (16) Preparation of meat, fish. 
b
 Origin and destination countries, labelled according to the officially assigned ISO 
3166-1 alpha-3 codes (UN Statistics Divisions, 2018), are classified into North 
(Developed Economies) and South (Developing Economies and Economies in 
transition), according to the United Nations’ country classification (2017). They are as 
follows: Australia (AUS), Canada (CAN), European Union (EUN), New Zealand 
(NZL), United States (USA) for North; Argentina (ARG), Bolivia (BOL), Brazil 
(BRA), China (CHN), Congo (COG), Egypt (EGY), Indonesia (IDN), India (IND), 
Libya (LBY), Morocco (MAR), Peru (PER), Russian Federation (RUS), Tunisia 
(TUN), South Africa (ZAF) for South. 
 
It seems that national policies are pushing consumers’ preferences toward nationally 
produced goods (in the North), to the detriment of imported goods (from the South). 
However, the expansion of trade flows originating from South balances out the closure 
of developed countries. 
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 According to the United Nations’ country classification (2017), we consider Australia, Canada, the 
European Union (EU), New Zealand, and the United States (US) as Northern (developed) countries, and 
emerging economies of the group of BRIICS (Brazil, Russian Federation , China, Indonesia, India, 
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Northern and Central Africa (Congo, Egypt, Libya, Morocco, Tunisia) as Southern (developing) 
countries. They cover 77% of the global gross domestic product (GDP): in 2015, developed economies, 
BRIICS countries, Egypt, and Peru are listed as top 25% economies for level of GDP. All these 
economies have benefited from a general growth in global welfare from 1995 to 2015: in particular, 
Bolivia and Congo have more than quadrupled their GDPs, while Libya, Morocco, and Tunisia have 
tripled their GDPs (CEPII, 2017). See www.cepii.fr/CEPII/en/bdd_modele/bdd.asp (last accessed in 9 
June 2017). 
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 UN Comtrade (2017). See comtrade.un.org/data/ (last accessed 29 September 2017). 
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The rapid growth in trade intensity of developing economies may be a direct 
consequence of two determinants: economic globalisation and structural changes in 
the composition of agri-food trade13. The globalisation has stimulated the development 
of global commodity chains and has created a deep economic integration14. In this 
regard, since 2000, the importance of developing economies has driven the 
development of global agri-food markets. In addition, developing countries have 
became export-oriented economies, with substantial variations within the composition 
of exports. In fact, trade has moved from traditional commodities (e.g., coffee, tea, 
sugar, cocoa) to non-traditional, high value commodities (e.g., fruit and vegetables, 
poultry, fish)15. 
The general increase in trade intensity may be also due to the progressive process of 
trade liberalisation, as well as to the provision of restrictive standards to fulfil bilateral 
agreements16. The vast majority of countries have sought to improve their market 
access though preferential, bilateral, and regional trade agreements. In fact, while 
multilateral negotiations have stalled, a number of collective trade agreements has 
entered into force (figure 2). Since 2000, there has been an increasing number of new 
agreements notified to the WTO and a consistent growth in the stock of agreements in 
place: in 2017, the trade agreements are 314 (compared to 96 in 2000), of which 90% 
are regional (RTAs) and 10% are preferential (PTAs)17. 
Successful trade agreements facilitate market access, by including tariff cuts and other 
market access concessions18, and contribute to a larger trade response19. In particular, 
trade agreements have a dual effect on trade response: they push toward the creation of 
intra-bloc trade, and lead to trade diversion toward developing countries20. 
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 Henson et al. (2000). 
14
 Disdier et al. (2015). 
15
 Henson and Loader (2001). 
16
 Disdier et al. (2015). 
17
 See rtais.wto.org/UI/Charts.aspx# and ptadb.wto.org/ptaList.aspx (last accessed 12 January 2018). 
18
 OECD (2015). 
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 Grant and Lambert (2008). 
20
 Koo et al. (2006), Lambert and McKoy (2009), Sun and Reed (2010). 
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Figure 2. Global trade agreements by year of entry into force, 1990-2017. 
 
Source: elaboration on Regional Trade Agreements Information System (RTA-IS, 
2018) and Database on Preferential Trade Arrangements (WTO, 2018). 
Notes: Acronyms are as follows: Preferential Trade Agreements (PTAs) and Regional 
Trade Agreements (RTAs). 
 
3 Policy instruments in agri-food trade 
Changes in global agri-food trade have stimulated a reorganisation in the system of 
policy interventions. Since the negotiations of the World Trade Organisation (WTO), 
which have substantially reduced tariffs and fostered trade across the globe, a number 
of border measures for several agri-food categories remains high. 
Figure 3 shows the number of new policy interventions occurred in agri-food sector in 
a decade, distinguishing between harmful and liberalising instruments. Harmful 
interventions are in great number with respect to liberalising ones. In 2018, the policy 
interventions in force in agri-food sector are 11,236 (46% import tariffs, 54% non-
tariff instruments). In particular, import tariffs account for 47% and 53% for harmful 
and liberalising interventions, vice-versa non-tariff instruments account respectively 
for 75% and 25%. It is worth noting that 85% of the total number of policy 
interventions is implemented by countries of the European Union (EU) and by 
emerging economies of BRIIC (Brazil, Russian Federation, India, Indonesia, China)21. 
Despite a reduction in the level of tariffs (in particular of harmful tariffs), the level of 
non-tariff instruments has remained high and, indeed, has increased over time: non-
tariff instruments are policy measures, alternative to tariffs, capable of shaping trade 
flows22; their growing (ab)use has led to a less transparent trade policy environment23. 
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 See www.globaltradealert.org/ (last accessed 15 March 2018). 
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 Arita et al. (2017). 
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 Fernandes et al. (2017). 
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Figure 3. Number of policy interventions per year in agri-food sector: 2008-2018. 
 
Source: elaboration on Global Trade Alert (2018). 
 
The rationale of non-tariff policies has changed overtime. A dated view depicts non-
tariff instruments as “non-tariff barriers” (NTBs), so to emphasise their protectionist 
scopes (e.g. quotas, export restraints). More recently, economists and policymakers 
prefer the term “non-tariff measures” (NTMs), in order to include a wider, and more 
diversified, set of measures which may hamper or facilitate trade24. 
The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development defines NTMs as “policy 
measures other than ordinary customs tariffs that can potentially have an economic 
effect on international trade in goods, changing quantities traded, or prices or both”25. 
NTMs may also have a corrective role, by reducing asymmetric information in the 
marketplace (Technical Barriers to Trade, TBTs), mitigating risks in consumption, 
improving the sustainability of eco-systems (Sanitary and Phytosanitary Standards, 
SPSs), and influencing the competition and the decision to import or export (non-
technical NTMs). Table 2 lists and describes NTMs set on the occasion of WTO 
consultations. 
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Table 2. Classification and description of Non-Tariff Measures (NTMs). 
Type Chapter Classification Description 
Technical 
measure 
A Sanitary and Phytosanitary Standards (SPSs) 
Measures that are applied to protect human or animal life from risks arising from additives, 
contaminants, toxins or disease-causing organisms in their food; to protect human life from 
plant- or animal-carried diseases; to protect animal or plant life from pests, diseases, or 
disease-causing organisms; to prevent or limit other damage to a country from the entry, 
establishment or spread of pests; and to protect biodiversity. 
B Technical Barriers to Trade (TBTs) 
Measures referring to technical regulations, and procedures for assessment of conformity 
with technical regulations and standards, excluding measures covered by the SPS 
Agreement. 
C Pre-Shipment inspections 
Compulsory quality, quantity and price control of goods prior to shipment from the 
exporting country, conducted by an independent inspecting agency mandated by the 
authorities of the importing country. 
Non technical 
measure 
D Contingent trade-protective 
measures 
Measures implemented to counteract particular adverse effects of imports in the market of 
the importing country, including measures aimed at unfair foreign trade practices, 
contingent upon the fulfillment of certain procedural and substantive requirements. 
E Quantity-control measure Control measures generally aimed at restraining the quantity of goods that can be imported, 
regardless of whether they come from different sources or one specific supplier. 
F Price-control measures 
Measures implemented to control or affect the prices of imported goods in order to, inter 
alia, support the domestic price of certain products when the import prices of these goods 
are lower; establish the domestic price of certain products because of price fluctuation in 
domestic markets, or price instability in a foreign market; or to increase or preserve tax 
revenue. This category also includes measures other than tariffs measures that increase the 
cost of imports in a similar manner, i.e. by fixed percentage or by a fixed amount. They are 
also known as para-tariff measures. 
9 
G Finance measures 
Finance measures are intended to regulate the access to and cost of foreign exchange for 
imports and define the terms of payment. They may increase import costs in the same 
manner as tariff measures. 
H Measures affecting 
competition 
Measures to grant exclusive or special preferences or privileges to one or more limited 
group of economic operators. 
I Trade-related investment 
measures 
Requirements to purchase or use certain minimum levels or types of domestically produced 
or sourced products, or restrictions on the purchase or use of imported products based on 
the volume or value of exports of local products. 
Restrictions on the importation of products used in or related to local production, including 
in relation to the amount of local products exported; or limitations on access to foreign 
exchange used for such importation based on the foreign exchange inflows attributable to 
the enterprise in question. 
J Distribution restrictions Distribution of goods inside the importing country may be restricted. It may be controlled through additional license or certification requirements. 
K Restrictions on post-sales 
services 
Measures restricting producers of exported goods to provide post-sales service in the 
importing country. 
L Subsidies Financial contribution by a government or public body, or via government entrustment or direction of a private body (direct or potential direct transfer of funds. 
M Government Procurement Measures controlling the purchase of goods by government agencies, generally by preferring national providers. 
N Intellectual property 
Measures related to intellectual property rights in trade: Intellectual property legislation 
covers patents, trademarks, industrial designs, layout designs of integrated circuits, 
copyright, geographical indications and trade secrets. 
O Rules of origin Rules of origin cover laws, regulations and administrative determinations of general 
application applied by government of importing countries to determine the country of 
10 
origin of goods. Rules of origin are important in implementing trade policy instruments 
such as antidumping and countervailing duties, origin marking and safeguard measures. 
P Export-related measures Export-related measures are measures applied by the government of the exporting country 
on exported goods. 
Source: International Classification of Non-Tariff measures, February 2012 version (UNCTAD/DITC/TAB/2012/2). 
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The total number of NTMs that governs trade of agri-food products has increased 
tremendously over the past decades, in particular during the period 2005-2015 (from 
1.09 mln to 3.41 mln)26. In fact, the food price crisis in 2007/2008 has led to changes 
in agri-food trade policies. In the short term, a number of governments imposed export 
restrictions and varied import duties in an attempt to insulate domestic consumption 
from volatility of international price27. However, the effect of protectionist trade 
policy on domestic and international markets is asymmetric. In that, the gain in terms 
of reduced volatility of domestic market comes at expenses of an increase in volatility 
of international market: the larger the trading country interested by the intervention, 
the larger the impact28. In the medium-long term, many countries have maintained 
more defensive trade policies towards international markets, exacerbating standards 
requirements for imports: emblematic is the case of SPSs which have dramatically 
increased by 178% from 2005 to 2015 (figure 4)29. 
 
Figure 4. Global number of NTMs imposed on agri-food products: detail by type of 
NTMs in 1995, 2005, 2015. 
 
Source: elaboration on UNCTAD (2017), TRAINS NTMs: The Global Database on 
Non-Tariff Measures. 
Notes: Categories of non-tariff measures (NTMs) are coded according to the 
UNCTAD classification (UNCTAD, 2012): Sanitary and Phytosanitary Standard 
(SPS) (A), Technical Barrier to Trade (TBT) (B), Pre-Shipment inspection (C), 
Contingent trade-protective measure (D), Quantity-control measure (E), Price-control 
measure (F), Finance measure (G), Measure affecting competition (H), Export-related 
measure (P). 
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 See trains.unctad.org/Forms/Analysis.aspx (last accessed 15 September 2017). 
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 Greenville (2015). 
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 Anderson and Nelgen (2011), Ivanic and Martin (2014), Santeramo et al. (2018); Santeramo and 
Lamonaca (2018a). 
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 See trains.unctad.org/Forms/Analysis.aspx (last accessed 15 September 2017). 
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SPSs are the most widespread measures that affect agri-food trade, due to their 
economic significance and negotiating options for reform30. The pervasiveness of 
SPSs in agri-food trade is essentially due to the sensitive nature of covered issues (e.g. 
protection of human or animal life from risks arising from additives, contaminants, 
toxins or disease-causing organisms in their food; protection of human life from plant- 
or animal-carried diseases; protection of animal or plant life from pests, diseases, or 
disease-causing organisms; prevention of damage to a country from the entry, 
establishment or spread of pests; protection of biodiversity)31. 
Figure 5 shows the number of SPSs implemented in agri-food sector, in force in 2017. 
The most affected product categories are fish (27%), meat (14%), vegetables (9%), 
dairy produce (8%), preparation of meat and fish (8%), fruits and nuts (7%), oil seeds 
and oleaginous fruits (5%), and cereals (3%)32. In general, SPSs concern trade of fresh 
products33. In that, the risk that the abovementioned product categories are subject to 
dissemination of disease or pests is higher, due to a greater perishability. 
In particular, the most implemented SPSs, in force in 2017 for agri-food products, are 
certification requirement (A830, 18%), special authorisation requirement for SPS 
reasons (A140, 17%), tolerance limits for residues of or contamination by certain 
(non-microbiological) substances (A210, 10%), testing requirement (A820, 8%), 
geographic restrictions on eligibility (A120, 7%), packaging requirements (A330, 6%), 
labelling requirements (A310, 4%) (figure 6)34. Table 2 describes in detail the most 
implemented SPSs, according to the UNCTAD’s international classification of 
NTMs35. 
 
                                                          
30
 Dal Bianco et al. (2016), Grant and Arita (2017). 
31
 UNCTAD (2012, p.7). 
32
 See trains.unctad.org/Forms/Analysis.aspx (last accessed 15 September 2017). 
33
 Grant and Arita (2017). 
34
 See trains.unctad.org/Forms/Analysis.aspx (last accessed 15 September 2017). 
35
 UNCTAD (2012). 
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Figure 5. Number of Sanitary and Phytonaitary Standards (SPSs) imposed in agri-food sector: detail by product category in 2017. 
 
Source: elaboration on UNCTAD (2017), TRAINS NTMs: The Global Database on Non-Tariff Measures. 
Notes: Product categories are coded according to the Harmonised System (HS) 2-Digit Chapter Headings: (01) Live animals; (02) Meat; (03) Fish; 
(04) Dairy produce; (05) Products of animal origin; (06) Live trees and other plants; (07) Edible vegetables; (08) Edible fruit and nuts; (09) Coffee, 
tea, mate and spices; (10) Cereals; (11) Products of the milling industry; (12) Oil seeds and oleaginous fruits; (13) Lac; (14) Vegetable planting 
material; (15) Animal or vegetable fats and oils; (16) Preparation of meat, fish; (17) Sugars and sugar confectionery; (18) Cocoa and cocoa 
preparations; (19) Preparations of cereals, flour, starch or milk; (20) Preparations of vegetables, fruits; (21) Miscellaneous edible preparations; (22) 
Beverages, spirits and vinegar; (23) Residues and wastes of food industries; (24) Tobacco. 
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Figure 6. Number of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Standards (SPSs) imposed in agri-food sector: detail by SPS category in 2017. 
 
Source: elaboration on UNCTAD (2017), TRAINS NTMs: The Global Database on Non-Tariff Measures. 
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Notes: SPS macro-categories are coded according to the UNCTAD classification: (A1) Prohibitions/restriction of imports for SPS reasons; (A2) 
Tolerance limits for residues and restricted use of substances; (A3) Labelling, Marking and Packaging requirements; (A4) Hygienic Requirements; 
(A5) Treatments for elimination of plant and animal pests and disease-causing organisms in the final product (e.g. Post-harvest treatment); (A6) 
Other Requirements on Production or Post-Production Processes; (A8) Conformity Assessment related to SPS; (A9) SPS Measures, not elsewhere 
specified (n.e.s.). 
 
Table 3. Details on types of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Standards (SPSs). 
Code Name Description Example 
A120 
Geographic 
restrictions on 
eligibility 
Prohibition of imports of specified products from specific countries 
or regions due to lack of evidence of sufficient safety conditions to 
avoid sanitary and phytosanitary hazards. The restriction is imposed 
automatically until the country proves employment of satisfactory 
sanitary and phytosanitary measures to provide a certain level of 
protection against hazards that is considered acceptable. Eligible 
countries are put on a “positive list”. Imports from other countries 
are prohibited. The list may include authorized production 
establishments within the eligible country 
Imports of dairy products from 
countries that have not proven 
satisfactory sanitary conditions are 
prohibited. 
A140 
Special authorisation 
requirement for SPS 
reasons 
A requirement that importers should receive authorisation, permits 
or approval from a relevant government agency of the destination 
country for SPS reasons: In order to obtain the authorisation, 
importers may need to comply with other related regulations and 
conformity assessments. 
An import authorisation from the 
Ministry of Health is required. 
A210 
Tolerance limits for 
residues of / or 
contamination by 
certain (non-
microbiological) 
A measure that establishes a maximum residue limit (MRL) or 
tolerance limit of substances such as fertilisers, pesticides, and 
certain chemicals and metals in food and feed, which are used 
during their production process but are not their intended 
ingredients. It includes a permissible maximum level for non-
(a) Maximum residue level is 
established for insecticides, pesticides, 
heavy metals and veterinary drug 
residues; 
16 
substances microbiological contaminants. (b) chemicals generated during 
processing; 
(c) residues of dithianon in apples and 
hop. 
A310 Labelling 
requirements 
Measures defining the information directly related to food safety, 
which should be provided to the consumer: Labelling is any written, 
electronic or graphic communication on the consumer packaging or 
on a separate but associated label. 
(a) Labels that must specify the storage 
conditions such as “5 degree C 
maximum”; 
(b) potentially dangerous ingredients 
such as allergens, e.g. “contains honey 
not suitable for children under one year 
of age”. 
A330 Packaging 
requirements 
Measures regulating the mode in which goods must be or cannot be 
packed, or defining the packaging materials to be used, which are 
directly related to food safety. 
Use of PVC films for food packaging is 
restricted. 
A820 Testing requirement 
A requirement for products to be tested against a given regulation, 
such as maximum residue level: This measure includes the cases 
where there is sampling requirement. 
A test on a sample of orange imports is 
required to check against the maximum 
residue level of pesticides. 
A830 Certification 
requirement 
Certification of conformity with a given regulation that is required 
by the importing country but may be issued in the exporting or the 
importing country. 
Certificate of conformity for materials 
in contact with food (containers, papers, 
plastics, etc.) is required. 
Source: International Classification of Non-Tariff measures, February 2012 version (UNCTAD/DITC/TAB/2012/2). 
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Considering the most regulated agri-food products and a set of developed (North) and developing 
(South) countries36, we find that the total number of implemented SPSs has more than tripled during 
the period 1995-2015 (from 33 to 126 thousand)37 (table 3) In particular, SPSs implemented by 
developed countries have doubled, while the growth in the number of SPSs set by developing 
countries has been impressive: from 0.8 to 65.8 thousand38. Albeit traditional trade barriers (tariffs) 
continue to decline, protectionist interests of countries persist through an increasing and frequently 
non-transparent use of food safety regulations39. 
 
Table 4. Number of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Standards (SPSs) imposed on selected agri-food 
product categoriesa in 1995 and 2015: detail by trade patternsb. 
Implementing country 
Affected country 
North South Total 
1995 2015 1995 2015 1995 2015 
North 14,025 24,044 18,622 36,455 32,647 60,499 
South 151 29,067 649 36,696 800 65,763 
Total 14,176 53,111 19,271 73,151 33,447 126,262 
Source: TRAINS NTMs: The Global Database on Non-Tariff Measures (UNCTAD, 2017). 
a
 Product categories, coded according to the Harmonized System (HS) 2-Digit Chapter Headings, 
are as follows: (02) Meat; (03) Fish; (04) Dairy produce; (07) Edible vegetables; (08) Edible fruit 
and nuts; (10) Cereals; (12) Oil seeds and oleaginous fruits; (16) Preparation of meat, fish. 
b
 Origin and destination countries, labelled according to the officially assigned ISO 3166-1 alpha-3 
codes (UN Statistics Divisions, 2018), are classified into North (Developed Economies) and South 
(Developing Economies and Economies in transition), according to the United Nations’ country 
classification (2017). They are as follows: Australia (AUS), Canada (CAN), European Union 
(EUN), New Zealand (NZL), United States (USA) for North; Argentina (ARG), Bolivia (BOL), 
Brazil (BRA), China (CHN), Congo (COG), Egypt (EGY), Indonesia (IDN), India (IND), Libya 
(LBY), Morocco (MAR), Peru (PER), Russian Federation (RUS), Tunisia (TUN), South Africa 
(ZAF) for South. 
 
Differences related to the intensity of regulations emerges at country level (figure 7): from 1995 to 
2015, the number of countries implementing SPSs has more than doubled, and the number of SPSs 
is about seven times greater (from 33 to 126 thousand). In 1995, the United States (US) were 
responsible for 96% of the total of implemented SPSs; China (2%), New Zealand (2%), Brazil, and 
Argentina (1%) had a lower contribution. In 2015, the set of imposing countries includes also 
economies of Latin America (i.e. Bolivia and Peru) and some of the BRIICS countries (i.e. Russian 
                                                          
36
 We analyse product categories, coded according to the Harmonised System (HS) 2-Digit Chapter Headings: meat 
(02), fish (03), dairy produce (04), edible vegetables (07), edible fruits and nuts (08), cereals (10), oil seeds and 
oleaginous fruits (12), preparation of meat and fish (16).According to the United Nations’ country classification (2017), 
we consider Australia, Canada, the European Union (EU), New Zealand, and the United States (US) as Northern 
(developed) countries, and emerging economies of the group of BRIICS (Brazil, Russian Federation , China, Indonesia, 
India, South Africa), as well as other countries of Latin America (Argentina, Plurinational State of Bolivia, Peru) and of 
the Northern and Central Africa (Congo, Egypt, Libya, Morocco, Tunisia) as Southern (developing) countries. 
37
 See trains.unctad.org/Forms/Analysis.aspx (last accessed 15 September 2017). 
38
 See trains.unctad.org/Forms/Analysis.aspx (last accessed 15 September 2017). 
39
 Jongwanich (2009). 
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Federation and Indonesia). In particular, the US preserves the leadership of implementing country 
(35%), followed by Indonesia (32%), New Zealand (10%), Brazil (8%), and Russian Federation 
(7%). From 1995 to 2015, the number of imposed SPSs has approximately doubled in China (from 
684 to 1,247) and in the US (from 32,096 to 43,982), and it has grown exponentially in Argentina 
(from 4 to 915), Brazil (from 112 to 10,207), and New Zealand (from 551 to 12,947)40. 
A distinctive trait: none of the African countries (Congo, Egypt, Libya, Morocco, Tunisia) has 
implemented SPSs neither in 1995 nor in 2015; the same consideration is for the EU, Australia, and 
India. 
A plausible explanation of the lack of imposition in African countries or in India is that the effective 
implementation of SPSs requires binding commitments to provide adequate financial and technical 
assistance to developing countries. As a consequence, developing countries do not consider the 
implementation of SPSs a way to establish a dynamic trade environment in domestic economy41. In 
addition to this general belief, developing countries have frequently incurred in SPSs’ crises. For 
instance, in 1998 the EU banned fishery product imports from Kenya, Mozambique, Tanzania, and 
Uganda to safeguard the EU consumers from the risk of cholera42. In 2000, the EU also removed 
India from the list of approved countries for imports of egg powder, seafood products, and mango 
pulp due to high pesticide residues43. The inability of developing countries to meet foreign 
standards may contribute to reduce the probability to set domestic standards in WTO consultations. 
As regard the EU, member states frequently use requirements on Maximum Residue Levels (MRLs) 
to ensure safe imports as an alternative to SPSs. For all food and animal feed, the European 
Commission fixes MRLs that considers legally tolerable. Requirements on MRLs are not set on the 
occasion of WTO consultations, but they may be assimilated to the SPS A200 on the tolerance 
limits for residues and the restricted use of certain substances in food and feed44. It seems that 
Australia follows a similar approach in adopting MRLs instead of SPSs. The imposition of MRLs in 
the EU and/or in Australia is well documented in a number of eminent studies45. 
Countries that have increased or introduced SPSs have also amplified their trade openness ratio46 
from 1995 to 2015: in particular, we observe the greatest growth in trade openness ratio (from 1995 
to 2015) for Bolivia (+20%), China (+13%), Argentina (+6%), and Peru (+4%); Canada and New 
Zealand are economies with the highest agricultural propensity (figure 7). Changes in the intensity 
of trade and the increase of SPSs is unlikely to be a coincidence. 
From 1995 to 2015, the number of undergone SPSs is almost unchanged, exception made for the 
US, whose intensity of undergone SPSs (almost non-existent in 1995) was 4% in 2015, and 
Indonesia, for which the intensity of undergone SPSs decreases from 4% to 2% in two decades. The 
number of implemented SPSs has been reduced for meat-based products (-41%) and vegetables (-
36%), and it has tremendously increased for fishery products (+2773%). While in 1995 only 
Indonesia and Russian Federation have been interested by SPSs on fishery products, in 2015 SPSs 
have been raised against all countries: the relevant growth in the intensity of SPSs on fishery 
products may be due to a general increase in trade openness ratio for this category. The intensity of 
                                                          
40
 See trains.unctad.org/Forms/Analysis.aspx (last accessed 15 September 2017). 
41
 Athukorala and Jayasuriya (2003). 
42
 Henson et al. (2000). 
43
 Mehta and George (2003). 
44
 UNCTAD (2012). 
45
 E.g. Otsuki et al. (2001a, b), Wilson et al. (2003), Wilson and Otsuki (2004), Chen et al. (2008), Disdier and Marette 
(2010), Xiong and Beghin (2011), Drogué and DeMaria (2012), Melo et al. (2014). 
46
 In line with Wacziarg (2001), countries’ trade openness ratio is computed as the sum of domestic agri-food imports 
and exports compared to the annual GDP. Domestic agri-food imports and exports refer to product categories meat (02), 
fish (03), dairy produce (04), edible vegetables (07), edible fruit and nuts (08), cereals (10), oil seeds and oleaginous 
fruits (12), preparation of meat and fish (16). 
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SPSs for other products (i.e. dairy products, fruits, cereals, oil seeds, preparations of meat and fish) 
has remained stable47. 
 
                                                          
47
 See trains.unctad.org/Forms/Analysis.aspx (last accessed 15 September 2017). 
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Figure 7. Trade intensity, imposed and undergone Sanitary and Phytosanitary Standards (SPSs): a comparison between 1995 and 2015. 
 
Source: elaboration on UN Comtrade (2017), TRAINS NTMs: The Global Database on Non-Tariff Measures (UNCTAD, 2017), and Centre 
d’Études Prospectives et d’Informations Internationales (CEPII, 2017). 
Notes: 
a
 Countries, labelled according to the officially assigned ISO 3166-1 alpha-3 codes (UN Statistics Divisions, 2018), are as follows: Argentina 
(ARG), Australia (AUS), Plurinational State of Bolivia (BOL), Brazil (BRA), Canada (CAN), China (CHN), Congo (COG), Egypt (EGY), 
European Union (EUN), Indonesia (IDN), India (IND), Libya (LBY), Morocco (MAR), New Zealand (NZL), Peru (PER), Russian Federation 
(RUS), Tunisia (TUN), United States (USA), South Africa (ZAF). 
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b
 Product categories, coded according to the Harmonized System (HS) 2-Digit Chapter Headings, are as follows: (02) Meat; (03) Fish; (04) Dairy 
produce; (07) Edible vegetables; (08) Edible fruit and nuts; (10) Cereals; (12) Oil seeds and oleaginous fruits; (16) Preparation of meat, fish. 
c
 Countries’ trade openness ratio is computed as the sum of domestic agri-food imports and exports compared to the annual GDP. Data on GDP are 
not available for LBY and ZAF in 1995 and for LBY in 2015: thus, the trade openness ratio refers to 1998 and 2013 for LBY and to 2000 for ZAF. 
d
 Countries’ intensity of undergone SPSs is computed as the ratio between the number of SPSs undergone in a country and the total of undergone 
SPSs in the analysed sample. 
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4 The trade effect of non-tariff measures 
4.1 A theoretical framework 
The implicit comparison that frequently occurs between tariffs and non-tariff measures 
(NTMs) is not completely valid. Tariffs are protectionist by definition, and undermine 
the social welfare by crowding out trade48. NTMs may be protectionist or competitive 
for trade, and imply welfare redistributions by addressing market imperfections 
(asymmetric information, externalities)49. From a social perspective, while the optimal 
level of tariffs is zero, determining the optimal level of NTMs is a huge challenge for 
policymakers50: such a difficulty depends on the complex relationship existing 
between trade and social effects of NTMs51. 
In order to discriminate between catalyst and barrier effects of NTMs on trade, we 
suppose that a small open economy sets a NTM on a product category, produced in 
domestic market and also imported from country’s trading partners. The aim of the 
policymaker is to maximise domestic welfare in terms of increase of consumers’ 
surplus and producers’ profits. In domestic market, the optimal level of a NTM results 
from the trade-off between the marginal utility gain for consumers and the marginal 
cost for producers. However, in a small open economy, the effects of a NTM on 
domestic welfare is influenced by the behaviour of trading partners: thus, a NTM 
determines potential trade effects. NTMs affect trade in all but one case, that is when 
the effects on domestic production exactly offset the effects on domestic 
consumption52. Given the existence of asymmetric information and/or externalities, 
attributing a catalyst or a barrier function to a NTM is a complex challenge. In general, 
by addressing market imperfections, NTMs are likely to influence incentive 
mechanisms and behaviours of consumers, producers, and trading partners. 
From the perspective of consumers, a non-tariff policy is socially desirable and 
provides higher social well-being. By reducing asymmetric information and/or 
externalities, NTMs boost consumers’ confidence in products under regulation, and 
reduces transaction costs53. The general effect is an increase in consumers’ utility and 
a consequent demand-enhancing effect (with a rightward shift of demand, from D to 
D’). The growing demand and the higher costs of implementing the measure 
determine an equilibrium price higher than the pre-NTM price (from p to p’): the 
consequence is an increase in consumption expenditures. The net effect of NTMs on 
consumers’ surplus depends on the magnitude of utility gain compared to the size of 
(negative) effect on consumption expenditures: the higher the consumers’ utility, the 
higher the willingness to pay a higher price for products under regulation54. 
From the perspective of producers, a non-tariff policy implies higher costs of 
compliance, in terms of fixed costs (e.g. upgrade of practice codes and facilities, 
acquisition of certificates, conformity in marketing requirements) and variable costs 
(e.g. prolonged delivery time due to inspection and testing procedures at custom 
points, rejection of certain shipments, denial of entry of certain shipments)55. By 
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 Swinnen (2016). 
49
 Xiong and Beghin (2014). 
50
 Swinnen (2017). 
51
 Sheldon (2012). 
52
 Swinnen (2016). 
53
 Xiong and Beghin (2014). 
54
 Crivelli and Gröschl (2016), Swinnen (2016). 
55
 Xiong and Beghin (2014), Crivelli and Gröschl (2016). 
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increasing the costs of implementing more stringent standards, NTMs reduce 
producers’ profits. The consequence is a supply-contraction effect (with a leftward 
shift of supply, from S to S’). The reduced supply determines an equilibrium price 
higher than the pre-NTM price (from p to p’), and thus an increase in producers’ 
revenue. The net effect of a NTM on producers’ profits depends on the magnitude of 
gain in revenue compared to the size of (negative) implementation costs: the lower the 
implementation costs, the higher the gain in revenue for products under regulation56. 
For exporters, a non-tariff policy imposed in the destination country implies higher 
costs of compliance in order to meet the requirements, with a consequent increase in 
import price (from p(imp) to p(imp)’). Given the increased consumers demand for 
products under regulation, if the difference between import price pre- and post-NTM 
(          ) is greater (lower) than the difference between domestic price pre- and 
post-NTM (    ), domestic producers face lower (greater) implementation costs and 
obtain higher (lower) profits than foreign producers. The NTM has a barrier (catalyst) 
effect on trade if determines a reduction (increase) in domestic imports57. 
 
 
                                                                                      (1) 
 
                                                          
56
 Swinnen (2016). 
57
 Swinnen (2017). 
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Figure 8. “Standards as catalyst” vs. “Standards as barrier”: a theoretical framework. 
 
Notes: D and D’ are domestic market demand pre- and post-standard; S and S’ are domestic market supply pre-and post-standard; p and p’ are 
equilibrium price in domestic market pre- and post-standard; p(imp) e p(imp)’ are equilibrium import price pre- and post-standard; q(D) e q(S) are 
domestic demanded and supplied quantities pre-standard; q(D)’ e q(S)’ are domestic demanded and supplied quantities post-standard; q(D)-q(S) and 
q(D)’-q(S)’ are imports pre- and post-standard. 
 
25 
4.2 Evidence from empirical literature 
The extensive empirical literature on the nexus between non-tariff measures (NTMs) 
and trade provides contrasting evidence. A majority of researches suggests that NTMs 
hamper trade58. Other studies conclude that NTMs may have no impact59 or tend to 
foster trade60. Several researches find both positive and negative effects of NTMs on 
trade61. The mixed evidence may be partly explained by the large heterogeneity in 
empirical studies: some analyses are global, others are regional; few researches focus 
on aggregate NTMs, while many studies focus on product-specific NTMs62. 
Heterogeneity is also due to a variety of methodological and empirical approaches: 
differences emerge in proxies used to measure NTMs, types of data, and estimators. In 
addition, the magnitude and the direction of NTM’s trade effects tend to be sector- 
and/or product- specific63. To sum up, a direct comparison of results is not feasible. 
Only few studies provide a general overview on the trade effects of NTMs, and a 
remarkable case is Hoeckman and Nicita (2011) who suggest that NTMs are major 
frictions to trade of agri-food products. 
As for the trade effects of NTMs on different geographic and economic areas, it seems 
that NTMs are barriers to trade64. Studies on trade between developed countries 
provide different conclusions: negative effects65 and positive effects66 of NTMs on 
trade are found. Trade among developing countries tends to be frictioned by NTMs67. 
If we focus on the trade effects of specific NTMs, Technical Barriers to Trade (TBTs) 
attend to be catalysts for trade68, while Sanitary and Phytosanitary Standards (SPSs), 
may either hamper or facilitate trade. In fact, some studies support the “standards as 
barrier” view69, while others provide mixed results. A plausible explanation of the 
heterogeneity in findings for SPSs may be the effect of regulations: “there are specific 
measures that have a substantial positive impact and others with a significant negative 
impact. These effects can offset each other within a class”70. As for product-specific 
measures, the Maximum Residue Levels (MRLs) tend to act as barrier to trade71. 
Considering the influence of proxies used for NTMs, the relationship between 
standards and trade tends to be negative if standards are proxied by ad valorem 
equivalent (AVE)72, or by frequency index and/or coverage ratio73. Differently, if 
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 E.g. Cioffi et al. (2011), Santeramo and Cioffi (2012), Peterson et al. (2013), Dal Bianco et al. (2016). 
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 E.g. Sun et al. (2014), Shepotylo (2016). 
60
 E.g. de Frahan and Vancauteren (2006), Cardamone (2011). 
61
 E.g. Xiong and Beghin (2011), Beckman and Arita (2016). 
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 Santeramo (2017). 
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 Santeramo et al. (2018). 
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 E.g. Essaji (2008), Anders and Caswell (2009), Disdier and Marette (2010). Few exceptions are 
Wilson and Otsuki (2003), Chevassus-Lozza et al. (2008), and Shepherd and Wilson (2013), who 
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 de Frahan and Vancauteren (2006). 
67
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 E.g. de Frahan and Vancauteren (2006). 
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 E.g. Jongwanich (2009), Jayasinghe et al. (2010), Peterson et al. (2013), Crivelli and Gröschl (2016). 
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 Schlueter et al. (2009, p. 1489). 
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Wei et al. (2012), Ferro et al. (2015). 
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 E.g. Olper and Raimondi (2008), Arita et al. (2017). 
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standards are proxied by dummy or count variables, the results may be positive74 or 
negative75. 
 
5 Conclusions 
The contribution investigates the evolution of trade in agri-food sector and the 
potential correlations between trade and levels of policy intervention. 
Agri-food trade has assumed a great relevance over time, in terms of traded volumes 
and values, involved countries, and interested commodities. More importantly, there 
has been a trend reversal in trade patterns, with a remarkable growth in trade from 
developing countries. 
Changes in agri-food trade are related to a plethora of determinants: economic 
globalisation, changes in the composition of trade, progressive trade liberalisation, 
growing trade agreements, reorganisation of policy interventions76. The joint influence 
of these factors has contributed to the development of new dynamics in agri-food 
trade. In particular, it is likely that the proliferation of non-tariff measures (NTMs) and 
changes in trade patterns are strictly related. NTMs are policy instruments capable to 
shape trade in the same way as traditional tariffs. 
Since the negotiation of the World Trade Organisation (WTO), the number of NTMs 
has tripled. In particular, Sanitary and Phytosanitary Standards (SPSs) have grown 
exponentially, in terms of products coverage and number of implementing countries. 
SPSs are suitable to regulate trade of perishable agri-food products, such as meat-
based and seafood products, fruits and vegetables, cereals, fats and oils77. In addition, 
immediately after the trade liberalisation (1995), implementing SPSs was a 
prerogative of developed countries. Nowadays, developing countries have become 
important players in the WTO consultations78, although the United States remain the 
leader country. 
Comparing the evolution of trade and of NTMs in agri-food sector, we observe that 
potential relationships “cause-effect” exist: growing trade flows may have stimulated 
the increase of trade policy measures; but, in their turn, NTMs may have shaped trade. 
The combination of greater trade openness and levels of protection has stimulated an 
interesting academic debate. The empirical evidence show that NTMs may be trade 
catalysts or trade barriers: in particular, the effects are country-, product-, and 
measure-specific79. 
By providing an overview of the dynamics in trade and NTMs, our contribution would 
be instrumental to the vivid debate on the role of NTMs in the agri-food sector. 
 
  
                                                          
74
 E.g. Cardamone (2011), Shepherd and Wilson (2013). 
75
 E.g. Peterson et al. (2013), Dal Bianco et al. (2016). 
76
 Henson and Loader (2001), Grant and Lambert (2008), Sun and Reed (2010), Arita et al. (2017). 
77
 Dal Bianco et al. (2016), Grant and Arita (2017). 
78
 Martin (2018). 
79
 Santeramo (2017). 
27 
References 
Anders S, Caswell JA (2009) Standards-as-barriers versus standards-as-catalysts: 
Assessing the impact of HACCP implementation on U.S. seafood imports. American 
Journal of Agricultural Economics 91(2):310–321 
Anderson K, Martin W (2005) Agricultural trade reform and the Doha Development 
Agenda. The World Economy 28(9):1301-1327 
Anderson K, Nelgen S (2012) Trade barrier volatility and agricultural price 
stabilization. World Development 40(1):36-48 
Arita S, Beckman J, Mitchell L (2017) Reducing transatlantic barriers on US-EU agri-
food trade: What are the possible gains?. Food Policy 68:233-247 
Athukorala PC, Jayasuriya S (2003) Food safety issues, trade and WTO rules: a 
developing country perspective. The World Economy 26(9):1395-1416 
Bagwell K, Staiger R (2011) What Do Trade Negotiators Negotiate About? Empirical 
Evidence from the World Trade Organization. American Economic Review 
101(4):1238-73 
Beckman J, Arita S (2016) Modeling the Interplay between Sanitary and Phytosanitary 
Measures and Tariff-rate Quotas under Partial Trade Liberalization. American Journal 
of Agricultural Economics 99(4):1078–1095 
Cardamone P (2011) The effect of preferential trade agreements on monthly fruit 
exports to the European Union. European Review of Agricultural Economics 
38(4):553-586 
Chen C, Yang J, Findlay C (2008) Measuring the effect of food safety standards on 
China’s agricultural exports. Review of World Economics 144(1):83–106 
Chevassus-Lozza E, Latouche K, Majkovic D, Unguru M (2008) The importance of 
EU-15 borders for CEECs agri-food exports: The role of tariffs and non-tariff 
measures in the pre-accession period. Food Policy 33(6):595–606 
Cioffi ., Santeramo FG, Vitale CD (2011) The price stabilization effects of the EU 
entry price scheme for fruit and vegetables. Agricultural Economics 42(3):405-418 
Crivelli P, Gröschl J (2016) The impact of sanitary and phytosanitary measures on 
market entry and trade flows. The World Economy 39(3):444-473 
Dal Bianco A, Boatto VL, Caracciolo F, Santeramo FG (2016) Tariffs and non-tariff 
frictions in the world wine trade. European Review of Agricultural Economics 
43(1):31-57 
de Frahan BH, Vancauteren M (2006) Harmonisation of food regulations and trade in 
the Single Market: evidence from disaggregated data. European Review of 
Agricultural Economics 33(3):337-360 
Disdier AC, Fontagné L, Cadot O (2015) North-South standards harmonization and 
international trade. The World Bank Economic Review 29(2):327-352 
Disdier AC, Marette S (2010) The combination of gravity and welfare approaches for 
evaluating non-tariff measures. American Journal of Agricultural Economics 
92(3):713–726 
Drogué S, DeMaria F (2012) Pesticide residues and trade, the apple of discord?. Food 
Policy 37(6):641-649 
28 
Essaji A (2008) Technical regulations and specialization in international trade. Journal 
of International Economics 76(2):166-176 
Fernandes AM, Ferro E, Wilson JS (2017) Product Standards and Firms’ Export 
Decisions. The World Bank Economic Review [in press] 
Ferro E, Otsuki T, Wilson JS (2015) The effect of product standards on agricultural 
exports. Food Policy 50:68-79 
Fontagné L, Mayer T, Zignago S (2005) Trade in the triad: How easy is the access to 
large markets? Canadian Journal of Economics 38(4):1401–1430 
Grant JH, Arita S (2017) Sanitary and Phyto-Sanitary Measures: Assessment, 
Measurement, and Impact. IATRC Commissioned Paper, 21:1-53 
Grant JH, Lambert DM (2008) Do regional trade agreements increase members’ 
agricultural trade?. American journal of agricultural economics 90(3):765-782 
Greenville J (2015) Issues in agricultural trade policy: An overview. In Issues in 
Agricultural Trade Policy: Proceedings of the 2014 OECD Global Forum on 
Agriculture, May 
Harrigan J (1993) OECD imports and trade barriers in 1983. Journal of International 
Economics 34(1–2):91–111 
Henson S, Brouder AM, Mitullah W (2000) Food safety requirements and food 
exports from developing countries: the case of fish exports from Kenya to the 
European Union. American Journal of Agricultural Economics 82(5):1159-1169 
Henson S, Loader R (2001) Barriers to agricultural exports from developing countries: 
the role of sanitary and phytosanitary requirements. World development 29(1):85-102 
Ivanic M, Martin W (2014) Implications of domestic price insulation for global food 
price behavior. Journal of International Money and Finance 42:272-288 
Jayasinghe S, Beghin JC, Moschini GC (2010) Determinants of world demand for 
U.S. corn seeds: The role of trade costs. American Journal of Agricultural Economics 
92(4):999–1010 
Jongwanich J (2009) The impact of food safety standards on processed food exports 
from developing countries. Food Policy 34(5):447-457 
Koo WW, Kennedy PL, Skripnitchenko A (2006) Regional preferential trade 
agreements: Trade creation and diversion effects. Applied Economic Perspectives and 
Policy 28(3):408-415 
Lambert D, McKoy S (2009) Trade creation and diversion effects of preferential trade 
associations on agricultural and food trade. Journal of Agricultural Economics 
60(1):17-39 
Martin W (2018) A Research Agenda for International Agricultural Trade. Applied 
Economic Perspectives and Policy 40(1):155-173 
Mehta R, George J (2003). Processed food products exports from India: an exploration 
with SPS regime. Country report prepared under the ACIAR Project, International 
Food Safety Regulation and Processed Food Export from Developing Countries, 
Delhi: Research Information Systems and the Australian National University 
29 
Melo O, Engler A, Nahuehual L, Cofre G, Barrena J (2014) Do sanitary, 
phytosanitary, and quality-related standards affect international trade? Evidence from 
Chilean fruit exports. World Development 54:350-359 
OECD (2015) Regional trade agreements and agriculture. OECD Food, Agriculture 
and Fisheries Papers, No. 79, OECD Publishing, Paris 
Olper A, Raimondi V (2008) Explaining national border effects in the QUAD food 
trade. Journal of Agricultural Economics 59(3):436–462 
Otsuki T, Wilson JS, Sewadeh M (2001a) What price precaution? European 
harmonization of aflatoxin regulations and African groundnut exports. European 
Review of Agricultural Economics 28(2):263–283 
Otsuki T, Wilson JS, Sewadeh M (2001b) Saving two in a billion: quantifying the 
trade effect of European food safety standards on African exports. Food policy 
26(5):495-514 
Peterson E, Grant JH, Roberts D, Karov V (2013) Evaluating the trade restrictiveness 
of phytosanitary measures on US fresh fruit and vegetable imports. American Journal 
of Agricultural Economics 95(4):842-858 
Santeramo FG (2019) On Non-Tariff Measures and Changes in Trade Routes: From 
North-North to South-South Trade?. IATRC Commissioned Paper, No. 938-2019-
1580 
Santeramo FG, Cioffi A (2012) The entry price threshold in EU agriculture: Deterrent 
or barrier?. Journal of Policy Modeling 34(5):691-704 
Santeramo FG, Guerrieri V, Lamonaca E (2019a) On the evolution of trade and 
sanitary and phytosanitary standards: The role of trade agreements. Agriculture 9(1): 
2. 
Santeramo FG, Lamonaca E (2019a) On the Drivers of Global Grain Price Volatility: 
an empirical investigation. Agricultural Economics (AGRIECON) 65(1):31-42 
Santeramo FG, Lamonaca E (2019b) The Effects of Non‐tariff Measures on Agri‐food 
Trade: A Review and Meta‐analysis of Empirical Evidence. Journal of Agricultural 
Economics 71(1) [in press] 
Santeramo FG, Lamonaca E (2019c) On the impact of non-tariff measures on export 
performances of African agri-food sector. Agrekon 1-18 
Santeramo FG, Lamonaca E, Contò F, Nardone G, Stasi A (2018) Drivers of grain 
price volatility: a cursory critical review. Agricultural Economics (AGRIECON) 
64:347-356 
Santeramo FG, Lamonaca E, Nardone G, Seccia A (2019b) The benefits of country-
specific non-tariff measures in world wine trade. Wine Economics and Policy [in 
press] 
Scheepers S, Jooste A, Alemu ZG (2007) Quantifying the impact of phytosanitary 
standards with specific reference to MRLs on the trade flow of South African 
avocados to the EU. Agrekon 46(2):260–273 
Schuster M, Maertens M (2013) Do private standards create exclusive supply chains? 
New evidence from the Peruvian asparagus export sector. Food Policy 43:291-305 
Sheldon I (2012) North–South trade and standards: what can general equilibrium 
analysis tell us?. World Trade Review 11(3):376-389 
30 
Shepherd B, Wilson NL (2013) Product standards and developing country agricultural 
exports: The case of the European Union. Food Policy 42:1-10 
Shepotylo O (2016) Effect of non-tariff measures on extensive and intensive margins 
of exports in seafood trade. Marine Policy 68:47-54 
Sun D, Huang J, Yang J (2014) Do China’s food safety standards affect agricultural 
trade? The case of dairy products. China Agricultural Economic Review 6(1):21-37 
Sun L, Reed MR (2010) Impacts of free trade agreements on agricultural trade 
creation and trade diversion. American Journal of Agricultural Economics 92(5):1351-
1363 
Swinnen J (2016) Economics and politics of food standards, trade, and development. 
Agricultural Economics 47(1) 7-19 
Swinnen J (2017) Some dynamic aspects of food standards. American Journal of 
Agricultural Economics 99(2):321-338 
Trebilcock M, Pue K (2015) The Puzzle of Agricultural Exceptionalism in 
International Trade Policy. Journal of International Economic Law 18:233-60 
UNCTAD (2012) International Classification of Non-Tariff measures, February 2012 
version (UNCTAD/DITC/TAB/2012/2). New York, Geneva: United Nations. 
United Nations (2017) World Economic Situation and Prospects. United Nations New 
York. 
Wacziarg R (2001) Measuring the dynamic gains from trade. The World Bank 
Economic Review 15(3):393-429 
Wei G, Huang J, Yang J (2012) The impacts of food safety standards on China’s tea 
exports. China Economic Review 23(2):253-264 
Wilson JS, Otsuki T (2004) To spray or not to spray: Pesticides, banana exports, and 
food safety. Food Policy 29(2):131–146 
Wilson JS, Otsuki T, Majumdsar B (2003) Balancing food safety and risk: do drug 
residue limits affect international trade in beef?. Journal of International Trade & 
Economic Development 12(4):377-402 
Xiong B, Beghin JC (2011) Does European aflatoxin regulation hurt groundnut 
exporters from Africa?. European Review of Agricultural Economics 39(4):589-609 
Xiong B, Beghin JC (2014) Disentangling Demand‐Enhancing and Trade‐Cost Effects 
of Maximum Residue Regulations. Economic Inquiry 52(3):1190-1203 
Yue C, Beghin, JC (2009) Tariff equivalent and forgone trade effects of prohibitive 
technical barriers to trade. American Journal of Agricultural Economics 91(4):930-941 
